The only spin training required, is that for CFI applicants. If you are a CFI applicant, you will be the first line of defense in the prevention of private pilots becoming stall/spin fatality statistics. You, the CFI, will be the teaching the student pilots how to avoid stall/spin accidents. In addition, as a CFI you will be at a higher risk of becoming a stall/spin fatality statistic. How high? Private pilots make up 46% of the stall spin fatalities; commercial pilots (to include CFIs), make up 37% of the stall spin fatalities. That's 87% of the stall spin fatalities between private and commercial pilots. We ain't doing a good job of instructing stall/spins. (AOPA ASF Article)
As a CFI you will continuously be operating on the edge with students. Your best defense against becoming a statistic, is good, solid training. For spin training, find a CFI who specializes in aerobatics, spins, and/or upset recovery training.
Don't become a statistic, like the CFI in the NTSB accident report below!!!
Accident occurred Monday, January 09, 2006 in Lancaster, CA Probable Cause Approval Date: 9/27/2007 Aircraft: Cirrus Design Corp. SR20, registration: N526CD Injuries: 2 Fatal. While simulating an engine failure on climb-out, the airplane was observed to enter a left teardrop maneuver as it attempted to return to the airport. During the turn, the airplane stalled, entered a spin, and impacted level terrain 1 nautical mile northeast of the departure end of runway 06. The reported winds were 060 degrees at 15 knots. According to the air traffic controller working the local control position, after completing several touch-and-go landings on runway 06, the instructor requested the first of two teardrop return to runway engine-out maneuvers. During the first one, the airplane made a left teardrop 180-degree turn as it attempted to land on runway 24. During the turn, the airplane appeared to lose a significant amount of altitude. The controller stated that the airplane recovered prior to landing, and then executed a go-around to reenter the traffic pattern. During the second attempt, the airplane again entered a teardrop turn to the left and then "spin to the ground." An examination of the wreckage revealed that the airplane impacted the terrain in a 70-degree nose down, left wing low attitude. All flight control surfaces, engine, propeller, and Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) components were located at the site. The engine and propeller were embedded in the ground approximately 2 feet, and all three propeller blades exhibited rotational scoring. Recorded data was retrieved from the Avidyne Primary Flight Display (PFD) and Multi-Function Display (MFD). The data log retrieved for the accident flight included data from a time stamp of 12:17:36 to 13:32:00 on January 9, 2006. The next scheduled data-logging event would have been at 13:33:00; however, the unit operation ceased prior to reaching the next recording point. At the last data sampling point, the engine rpm (revolutions per minute) was at 2,680 rpm, the engine manifold pressure was 27.5 inches, and the airplane electrical bus voltage was 27.5 volts. The recorded data did not show any engine or system anomalies. The information from the download of the MFD was consistent with the visual information provided by witnesses.
The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:
The student pilot's failure to maintain an adequate airspeed while maneuvering, and, the flight instructor's inadequate supervision of the flight. A factor in the accident was the strong tailwind encountered as the airplane turned from an upwind to a downwind during the teardrop maneuver.